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Wittgenstein Reads Freud

by: Jacques Bouveresse
en

0691034257  9780691034256  9781400811106 



Wittgenstein Reads Freud
By Jacques Bouveresse




Product Description:

Did Freud present a scientific hypothesis about the unconscious, as he always maintained and as many of his disciples keep repeating? This question has long prompted debates concerning the legitimacy and usefulness of psychoanalysis, and it is of utmost importance to Lacanian analysts, whose main project has been to stress Freud's scientific grounding. Here Jacques Bouveresse, a noted authority on Ludwig Wittgenstein, contributes to the debate by turning to this Austrian-born philosopher and contemporary of Freud for a candid assessment of the early issues surrounding psychoanalysis. Wittgenstein, who himself had delivered a devastating critique of traditional philosophy, sympathetically pondered Freud's claim to have produced a scientific theory in proposing a new model of the human psyche. What Wittgenstein recognized--and what Bouveresse so eloquently stresses for today's reader--is that psychoanalysis does not aim to produce a change limited to the intellect but rather seeks to provoke an authentic change of human attitudes. The beauty behind the theory of the unconscious for Wittgenstein is that it breaks away from scientific, causal explanations to offer new forms of thinking and speaking, or rather, a new mythology.

Offering a critical view of all the texts in which Wittgenstein mentions Freud, Bouveresse immerses us in the intellectual climate of Vienna in the early part of the twentieth century. Although we come to see why Wittgenstein did not view psychoanalysis as a science proper, we are nonetheless made to feel the philosopher's sense of wonder and respect for the cultural task Freud took on as he found new ways meaningfully to discuss human concerns. Intertwined in this story of Wittgenstein's grappling with the theory of the unconscious is the story of how he came to question the authority of science and of philosophy itself. While aiming primarily at the clarification of Wittgenstein's opinion of Freud, Bouveresse's book can be read as a challenge to the French psychoanalytic school of Lacan and as a provocative commentary on cultural authority.



Amazon.com:

Is psychoanalysis a disciplined science or a blanket of hypotheses held loosely together by Freud's personal points of view? Jacques Bouveresse, a professor at the College de France, utilizes the work of the British Philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein to examine Sigmund Freud, the 20th century psychiatrist whose theories have guided modern-day psychoanalysis, but who some believe was nothing but an egomaniac and a fraud. Wittgenstein argued that, "To be a scientist, you have to put forward falsifiable hypothesis, and Freud can easily weasel his way around any putatively falsifying evidence, whereas physicists usually cannot." As Bouveresse examines the scientific usefulness of "ideas" versus facts, he questions whether we should relinquish many of our Freud-based beliefs.




Summary: An interesting and valid discussion
Rating: 4

A debate continues to rage in French academic circles as to psychoanalysis being a proper science of mind or merely a theoretical construct, a philosophical theory, simply another approach to viewing and interpreting the mind.

Jacques Lacan, for example, has exalted psychoanalysis to the status of a "meta-science" affecting all of the humanities, and claims that philosophy is in current need of psychoanalytic "science" in order to legitimize it as a relevant subject of the humanities.

Be that as it may, however, those somewhat acquainted with Wittgenstein's thought, realize that he proposed that we are limited by language; that the so-called "scientist" must restrain his/her impulse to say more than they actually know.

Wittgenstein believed Freud to be an extraordinary individual, though, in a letter to Norman Malcolm, he wrote, "Of course, (he) is full of fishy thinking & his charm & the charm of his subject is so great that you may be easily fooled." Freud believed himself to be a biological determinist, and argued that psychoanalysis was in fact a authentic science, and used persuasive and clever forms of reasoning to "prove" the existence, for example, of the unconscious, and its alleged predictable, measurable and ultimately, mechanical processes.

Wittgenstein proposed that psychoanalysis does not have much to do with science, but is really another form of representation, though a highly seductive one.

I found this to be a well-translated and well-written essay analysing the central issues in Freud's arguments and using Wittgenstein's scattered conversations about Freud to back the counter arguments. Bouveresse tackles the Reason and Cause arguments; the `Generalizing Impulse" in regards to justifying a theory; and Freud's method of dream interpretation, and shows it fails on many counts when analysed against the rigours of falsification and verification.

Although Wittgenstein views the tenets of psychoanalysis as "a manner of speaking" and not a valid science, he maintains Freud's power of persuasion and the originality of his thought. In the end, however, psychoanalysis is about persuasion, telling the analysand that such and such a thing is the "cause" of their particular malady, and influencing them to accept that diagnosis. These "explanations" have a particular charm for the analysand, whether they're actually the case or not.

This was an interesting discussion on Freud's theories and Wittgenstein's arguments against them. As a result, I have a better understanding of Freud and Wittgenstein.





Summary: Short and sweet
Rating: 5

A succinct but nonetheless comprehensive look at Wittgenstein's often-misunderstood views on Freud. It not only provides a new perspective on Wittgenstein's famous comparison of philosophy and psychotherapy, but also reveals Wittgenstein's criticisms of Freud to be both more subtle and more devastating than many of the more obvious and sweeping charges which have been levelled at Freud recently